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A.

Abstract
It is said that traditional international public law is state–centric and concerns mostly State
obligations and responsibility. For this, it excluded corporate actors from any accountability
mechanism, even when the corporations contribute to armed conflicts and international crimes.
International law does not provide a clear definition of what amounts to “subjects” under this set
of rules or criteria for how to determine legal personality. At the same time, some branches of
*
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international public law directly regulate corporate actions, namely international economic law and
international humanitarian law. Conversely, international courts and tribunals have accepted the
corporate jus standi, in some instances to defend corporate “human rights” or in other cases to
allow corporations to defend their economic interest against States. Yet, States and individuals
cannot bring claims against corporations before any international mechanism. Ultimately, the
international regulatory framework impedes the rights of victims and communities while allowing
for greater protection of corporate interest. This article challenges this doctrine by demonstrating
that international law can and should apply to corporations, and prosecutions against international
crimes should be part of transitional justice and dealing with the past.
Key words: Business and Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, Transitional Justice, Corporations,
International Crimes, International Humanitarian Law, Corporate Jus Standi, Legal Personality,
International Obligations, Non-State Actors

Introduction
The turn of the 21st century marked a profound change in the nature of conflicts around the world
and the role of corporations in the context of conflict. In terms of the major issue regarding access
to land and water, both the military and economic approaches complement each other.2 One of the
additional phenomena, specifically since the end of the Cold War, is the growing presence of
private military companies and their powerful partners consisting of multinational corporations,
which include natural resource extraction companies and private financial institutions.3 Indeed, we
are witnessing a growing role for companies in armed conflicts where their presence goes far
beyond the simple economic activities they are supposed to carry out.

2

Jelena Aparac, Business et droit de l’homme dans des conflits armés, Brylant, Brussels, (2021); the military approach
can take the form of direct conquest, which is increasingly rare these days (with the recent exception of Russian
invasion of Ukraine). A country can also invade a territory in order to profit from the resources of that country. Iraq in
2001 (a posteriori authorization, see U.N. Security Council, Letter dated May 8, 2003 from the Permanent
Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003); S. C.
Res.1483 (May 23, 2003); S. C. Res.1546 (June 8, 2004); See Libya in 2011, S. C. Res.1973 (March 17, 2011);
Finally, the third military possibility concerns secret wars, a strategy widely practiced by the United States in South
America. The economic approach aims to gain access to the territory through economic games, following the example
of what China practices in various African countries and increasingly in Latin America (the economic option par
excellence is linked to the provision of environmental services: water, waste and energy management, particularly in
the post-war phase, when the theater of operations is polluted by the fighting); see also Milson Betancourt, Mineria,
Violencia y Criminalizacion en America Latina, Dinamicas y Tendencias” Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en
America
Latina,
38-45,
2016,
https://www.ocmal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mineria-violencia-yAt
What
Cost?,
Global
Witness,
(2018),
Criminalizacion-OCMAL.pdf;
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost/ [last accessed May 24, 2021].
3
Ole Kristian Fauchald & Jo Stigen, Corporate Responsibility Before International Institutions, 40 The Geo. Wash.
Int’l L. Rev. 1033-1045 (2009); Andrew Feinstein, The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, Penguin Books,
London (2012).
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Multinational corporations have been at the center of debates surrounding their role in the global
economy (particularly within the context of the international division of labor), but also for their
involvement in serious violations of international law. Cases of corporate violence amounting to
serious human rights violations and international humanitarian law abuses have been widely
documented in both the Global South4 and the Global North.5 The former UN Special
Representative on Business and Human Rights recognized in 2011 that “[c]onflict situations are
one of the most difficult circumstances for human rights […] [t]he most egregious business-related
human rights abuses take place in conflict-affected areas and other situations of widespread
violence”.6 However, corporations enjoy almost absolute impunity, even in cases where their
abuses amount to international crimes.
Transitional justice took its contemporary form after the post-dictatorial transitions in Latin
America in the 1970s-1980s and the post-Cold War era. Post-war trials are understood today as
part of the transitional justice mechanisms during a period of democratic or post-conflict transition.
While the transitional justice mechanisms often use a different set of judicial and non-judicial
mechanisms to deal with past violations and seek reparations (from domestic or international trials
to truth seeking and fact-finding commissions),7 they often focus on conflict management and seek
to avoid disrupting the pre-existing social order. The objective of traditional transitional justice8 is
reconciliation between the parties to the conflict and the population affected by it, by restoring
mechanisms of responsibility and sanctions. The traditional concept of transitional justice thus
excludes external actors to the conflict, such as corporations.9 Moreover, this approach to
4

See UN Working Group on Mercenaries, Relationship Between Private Military and Security Companies and the
Extractive Industry from a Human Rights Perspective, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/42 (July 29, 2019) (hereinafter “WGM,
Extractive report”); Nigel D. White, Mary E. Footer, Kerry Senior, Mark van Dorp, Vincent Kiezebrink, Y. Wasi Gede
Puraka & Ayudya Fajri Anzas, Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia: Corporate Interests and Human
Rights in a Fragile Environment 65 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 217 (2018).
5
UN Working Group on Mercenaries, Impact of the Use of Private Military and Security Services in Immigration and
Border Management on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrants, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/45/9 (July 9, 2020); OHCHR,
Joint Communication, Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises; Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights; Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights
obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment; Special Rapporteur on the
rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association; Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders; Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples; and Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe
drinking water and sanitation, UA USA 14/2016 (Nov 11, 2016).
6
U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on the issue of human
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Business and Human Rights in
Conflict-affected regions: Challenges and Options Towards State Responses, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/32 (May 27,
2011).
7
Irene Pietropaoli, Business, Human Rights and Transitional Justice Routledge, London (2020) [hereinafter
“Pietropaoli 2020”]
8
See Marina Eudes, ‘La justice transitionnelle’ in Herve Ascensio, Emanuel Decaux, Alain Pellet (eds) Droit
International Pénal, Pédone, Paris, (2012), 593-594; Marcos Zunino, Subversive Justice: The Russell Vietnam War
Crimes Tribunal and Transitional Justice 10 (2) Int. J. Transit. Justice 211-229 (2016) [hereinafter “Zunino”]; Eric
Sottas, Transitional Justice and Sanctions 90 Int’L Rev. Red Cross 37 (2008).
9
Antony Anghie, B. S. Chimni, 77, Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in
Internal Conflicts, Chin. J. Int. Law 96-97 (2003), [hereinafter “Anghie and Chimni”]; Asad Kiyani, Legitimacy,
Legality, and the Possibility of Pluralist International Criminal Law in N. Hayashi, C. Bailliet, The Legitimacy of
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transitional justice is well rooted in the international institutional order10 which, through its
documents and discourses, maintains a vision of transitional justice that does not address the power
dynamics and external factors that contribute to violence.
Critics of transitional justice argue that the socio-economic aspects of conflicts with
external actors need to be better addressed to provide responses to affected communities.11 Indeed,
compromises based on the choice between “economic development or justice”12 might disregard
corporate responsibility. By excluding the social-economic aspects of conflicts, this approach to
justice implicitly contributes to the maintenance of the global economic order.13 This approach
further contributes to the status quo of international practices that imposes on States from the South
“unsustainable economic and social policies policed by international financial and trade
institutions,”14 exacerbating violence in the South while enriching the North. The need to address
corporate responsibility increased in the face of the expansion of multinational corporations and
the reinforcement of neoliberal ideologies through international institutions. Progressive national
efforts are moving towards the recognition that armed conflicts cannot be separated from their
economic and social causes, as well as their consequences; thus, they progressively include
corporate crimes. However, this is still not systematically adopted.15
International Criminal Tribunals (Studies on International Courts and Tribunals) at 101, Cambridge University Press
(2017), (According to the author, the legitimacy of the ICC can be questioned because of its case selectivity. He argues
that the focus on Africans by an international court reproduces a narrative of violence that leads to a false view of
violence because it excludes the states, but also private companies, that stimulated the conflict. Indeed, the author
questions whether the Court can be considered legitimate if it excludes the central role played by the plunder of natural
resources by corporations and other actors).
10
U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, Report of
the Secretary-General, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc., S/2004/616 (Aug 23, 2004) (“The notion of transitional justice discussed in the
present report comprises the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to
terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation. These may include both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international
involvement (or none at all) and individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and
dismissals, or a combination thereof.”). See also U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. S/2011/634 ( Oct 12, 2011).
11
See Zunino, supra note 8, at 212; see also “Driven by scholars from the Third World, TWAIL rejects the traditional
tenets and assumptions of traditional international law and argues for a re-imagination of the law of nations to purge it
of racial and hegemonic precepts and biases to create a truly universal corpus that embraces inclusivity and
empowerment. The movement turns away from the imperialist and colonialist foundation of international law. It argues
that international law must be devoid of oppression, exploitation, and domination”; Makau W. Mutua, What is Twail?,
Am. Society of Int’l L., Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting, 31-39 (2000).
12
See WGM, extractive report, supra note 4, ¶ 20: “The extractive industry constitutes a major source of national
revenue and exports for some States, especially those from the global South.”
13
See Zunino, supra note 8, at 224.
14
See Anghie and Chimni, supra note 9, at 89.
15
The Liberia Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report, included corporate abuses; la Sierra Leone Truth
Commission decided that “perpetrators may be both natural persons and corporate bodies, such as transnational
companies or corporations” and that its mandate “is not confined to violations of human rights that might constitute
crimes, under either national or international law, nor is it limited to violations committed by States or governments”;
The Timor-Leste Truth Commission investigated violations of social, economic, and cultural rights during the
Indonesian occupation and found that “violations of economic and social rights did not occur only as a by-product of
military operations”, but they were also “intertwined with private and corporate interests”; see Ruben Carranza,
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To the extent that corporations play a fundamental role in armed conflict, documenting their
wrongdoing is directly related to the transitional justice and protection of international peace and
security. Therefore, the need to identify and sanction corporate misconduct is part of a transitional
justice process. It allows many actors, in particular victims,16 to benefit from it. For instance,
gathering data concerning abuses is essential, although it is the most delicate task during a conflict
or immediately ex post. Inquiry commissions, fact-finding missions, and investigative mechanisms
help establish a certain truth by highlighting the crimes committed and fostering justice by
documenting corporate crimes and their impacts on society.17 These files, if they are built by
independent commissions and are sufficiently solid, do not only serve as preventive tools
(prevention of abuse), but can also be used during trials. By excluding a category of perpetrators–
the corporations–from transitional justice, a question arises: “Do the categories of perpetrators
provide only partial transitional justice and unfinished reconstruction of post war society?”.
This article aims to contribute to the critical discussion of transitional justice by challenging the
traditional approach to international law and proposing an interpretation that addresses the socioeconomic aspects of contemporary asymmetric armed conflicts and the role corporations play in
them. It will do so by (i) studying the premises of international law as an obstacle to create an
international legal framework that is directly applicable to corporations, and (ii) analyzing how the
framework favors corporate interests in international truth seeking and proceedings.

I.

Conceptually international law could regulate misconduct of multinational
corporations

International law regulates inter-State relationships. It does not regulate non-State actors. Rather,
it excludes them from any formal international law-making processes because of its traditional state
centric approach.
A. The constrained interpretation of international regulatory framework is
inadequate for transitional justice

Transitional Justice, Corporate Responsibility and Learning From the Global South, International Center for
Transitional Justice (April 28, 2015), http://jamesgstewart.com/transitional-justice-corporate-responsibility-andlearning-from-the-global-south/ (last accessed May 1, 2021); see also Pietropaoli, 2020.
16
“The importance of victims in international criminal proceedings is recognized by the ICC, which has set up a
dedicated body to protects victims’ rights, see Claude Jorda and Jérôme De Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the
Victim in: Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Commentary 1387 – 1419, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2002).
17
Martha Minow, The Hope for Healing: What can Truth Commissions do? in Robert I. Rotberg, Dennis Thompson
(eds.), Truth v. Justice: the Moral Efficacy of Truth Commissions in South Africa and Beyond, 235 (Princeton
University Press, 2000).
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Traditional international law rejects the legal personality of corporations, particularly their
multinational dimension, and does not adequately respond to relationships between non-state
international actors.
1. Constraint one: Rejection of international legal personality of corporations
International law and human rights law regulate corporate obligations indirectly through States. It
is primarily through the conduct of States, the principal subjects of international law, that the legal
personality of an entity can be identified through its municipal law.18 The question of whether an
international obligation is enforceable upon enterprises is often linked to the recognition of the
international legal personality of the corporation. However, these two questions are distinct. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has recognized the possibility that other subjects may exist in
international law without being identical in kind or in rights conferred.19
International law thus recognizes that its subjects are not identical and may vary according to social
realities and needs.20 However, international law does not provide a clear definition as to how to
define “legal personality.” Nor does it provide specific criteria to determine legal personality.
Consequently, the legal question that arises is whether, to be a subject of law, one must have the
capacity to have rights and obligations (as provided by the ICJ) or whether one is subject by the
explicit recognition of States?21 The capacity of the corporation to comply with international
obligations may be a necessary condition, but it is insufficient for establishing its legal personality.
However, the question of the enforceability of international law against corporate entities should
not be equated with the question of its legal personality. Indeed, a corporation might have the de
facto legal capacity to comply with international law and may thus enjoy a legal personality.22
Conversely, the State has a legal personality, but not all the capacities associated with it. For
example, the State cannot claim the right to marry.23 Furthermore, while international law does not
have a clear definition of what amounts to “subjects” or criteria on how to determine one, it allows
18

ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 178-179 April 11,
1949) [hereinafter “ICJ Reparations”].
19
Id, at 8.
20
Diego Quiroz, Expanding International Law to Non-state Actors (the Corporation) 32 S.A. Yearb. Int’l L. 68-73
(2007).
21
According to Professors Cameron and Chetail, the various concepts of legal personality can be summarized in three
distinct streams. First, a restrictive conception according to which only those entities are subjects of international law
which a) have the capacity to conclude international agreements, b) have the power to have diplomatic relations, and
c) have the power to act before an international jurisdiction. A second, less restrictive, school of thought considers that
all entities with the capacity to have rights and obligations under international law can be included. Finally, there is an
intermediate doctrine according to which two conditions must be met: being the rights holders and duties bearers in
the international arena on one side and being able to act before an international jurisdiction on the other side. See
Lindsey Cameron, Vincent Chetail, Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under Public
International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2013) [hereinafter “Cameron and Chetail”].
22
Id., at 70. In this regard, it should be noted that no subject of international law, State, international organization or
individual has the full capacity to enforce all international law.
23
Id.
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for prosecution of natural persons and criminal groups for international crimes before international
tribunals, which are not explicitly defined as “subjects” of international law. By doing so,
international criminal law has disrupted the state-centric concept of public international law and
could be the potential avenue for prosecuting corporate crimes. 24
Even though international law has not fully included corporations into its legal order, we can
consider that the conduct of States shows an emerging legal personality of corporations,25 which
corresponds to the progressive recognition of their growing roles in recent decades. According to
some authors,26 forty years of codification of corporate behavior through codes of conduct
demonstrate the progressive acceptance of the international legal personality of multinational
corporations.
The proliferation of codes of conduct is indeed evidence of the growing role played by companies
in international regulation. It is a process of international code development in which business
leaders will publicly accept a certain standard of conduct.27 Voluntary participation implies that the
corporation has freely chosen to subscribe to the voluntary commitments (but not the legal
obligations) set out in the document. In other words, by participating directly in a multilateral
process or by making a unilateral declaration, multinational companies ultimately create their own
rules which have international effects. While these rules remain non-binding, they contribute to the
creation of more binding rules through various processes, including: reference to the document by
the national legislature, replication of the document by intergovernmental bodies, inclusion of the
codes in investment contracts, and a contribution to international custom.28 Thus, a paradox of
24

Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn, Fragmentation, Diversification and “3D” Legal pluralism: International
Criminal Law as the Jack-in-the-box? in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds.), The Diversification and
Fragmentation of International Criminal Law Martinus Nijhoff Publishers) 27 (2012).
25
David Kinley, Rachel Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: the Private Implications of Public
International Law, 6(3) Hum. Rights L. Rev. 33 (2006) [hereinafter “Kinley and Chambers 2006”]. In the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, when the state-centric doctrine was at its strongest, British and Dutch companies were
invested with state powers, as they were allowed to make treaties, wage war (with a private army), and seize territory;
Markos Karavias, Corporate Obligation Under International Law 6, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2014)
[hereinafter “Karavias”].
26
See Cameron and Chetail, supra note 21, at 301-303. The authors refer to several other authors who demonstrate
that codes of conduct contain evidence of the willingness of states to assume that multinational enterprises do have a
legal personality; “ The legal personality of corporations under international law is limited and derivative”, Stephen
Tully, International Corporate Legal Responsibility, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005) [ hereinafter “Tully 2005”], at
9.
27
OCDE, Directorate for Financial, fiscal and enterprise affairs, “Code of Corporate Conduct”: Expanded Review
of their contents 3 (May, 2001).
28
On the dangers of privatization of the regulatory function see Helen Keller, “Corporate Codes of Conduct and their
Implementation:
The
Question
of
Legitimacy”,
available
at:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.696.2344&rep=rep1&type=pdf (last accessed May 12,
2021), at 57 ; Ans Kolk, Rob van Tulder, International Codes of Conduct, Trends, Sectors, Issues, Effectiveness”,
available
at:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228715653_International_Codes_of_Conduct_Trends_Sectors_Issues_and
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contemporary international law is created. On the one hand, the international law rejects legal
personality of multinational enterprises in international law and does not recognize them as
“subjects” of that law under the argument of avoiding granting them rights and duties in the
international arena, and on the other hand, they benefit some of the main inherent State powers in
international law, particularly creation of international rules.
Moreover, in many cases, these rules often concern the inherent functions of the State, including
the use of force (military action),29 the management of its natural resources which may call into
question the right of peoples to self-determination,30 or economic and monetary sovereignty.31 In
addition, many recent legal agreements demonstrate the evolution of international relations,
producing legal effects without the parties being subjects of international law.32 In some cases,
multinational companies themselves become an international legislator. Undeniably, agreements
between major companies in a given sector can create a special international law, a source of law
known as a “third order”.33 They can even create “internal legal micro-orders”34 where all the
entities within the same multinational corporation agree to create a rule. An example of this is the

_Effectiveness, at 2 (last accessed 12 May 2021) ; Carola Glinski, Corporate codes of Conduct: Moral or Legal
obligations? in Doreen McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu, Tom Campbell (eds.), The New Corporate Accountability,
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law 123, Claredon/Oxford Univ. Press, (2007); Bruno Simma, Phillip Alston,
The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles 12 Austral. Yearb. Int’l L. 82-108
(1992); Stephen Tully, Corporations and International Lawmaking 97, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston (2007),
[ hereinafter “Tully, 2007”). According to Mazuyer, the unilateral declaration will even be considered as soft law, see
Emmanuelle Mazuyer, L’autorégulation des entreprises par les codes de conduite : un mécanisme effectif pour les
engagements éthiques ? in Habib Gherari, Yann Kerbrat (eds.), L’entreprise dans la société internationale 200,
Pédone, Paris, (2010), See also Hans Wolfgang Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational
Enterprises 22 Ger. Yearb. Int’l L. 16-19 (1979).
29
See art. 2-4 and 51 UN Charter; See also OHCHR, Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law
Enforcement Officials Adopted by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment
of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, August 27 to September 7 1990.
30
G. A. Res. 523 (VI), Integrated Economic Development and Commercial Agreements, U.N. Doc. A/RES/523 (Feb
12, 1952). Resolution 523 (VI) recognized the principle of permanent sovereignty for the first time; G.A, Res. 1803
(XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, U.N. Doc. A/RES/1803 (Dec 14, 1962); WGM, Extractive
report.
31
Dominique Carreau, Patrick Juillard, Droit international économique, Dalloz, Paris (2007) [hereinafter “ Carreau
and Juillard”] ¶1207 at 430 : “Tout État est souverain et, parce qu’il est souverain, il détermine librement sa politique
économique et organise librement son espace économique ”.
32
See, for example, cease-fire or peace agreements, concession contracts between States and multinational companies,
agreements between colonial powers and local leaders (ICJ, Case concerning the land and maritime boundary between
Cameroon and Nigeria, (Cameroon v. Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgement of 10 October 2002, at 404406, ¶¶203-207, ICJ, Recueil 2002. Conversely, could certain agreements between States be considered private
contracts? Patrick Daillier, Mathias Forteau, Alain Pellet, Droit international public, Paris, L.G.D.J., Paris, (2009)
[hereinafter “Daillier et al. 2009”], p. 133; See also Keller, at 29.
33
See Carreau and Juillard, supra note 31 at 10.
34
Valérie Pironon, “Groupes multinationaux, filiales et succursales”, JCL Droit International, Fasc. 570-75 (2011-3),
[hereinafter “Pironon”] at 4.
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private monetary and financial market (euro currencies and euro bonds) built by international banks
which have experienced a prodigious progress in recent decades. 35
Juridical personality is not a static concept and can be conferred on a legal person in various forms.
Consequently, the difficulty lies in the absence of a central body that can determine who has legal
personality under international law.36
2. Constraint two: International law does not capture the multinational character of
corporations and their transnational operations
A multinational corporation is made up of several entities that are often legally separated. Each
entity within the group has the nationality of the state where it is located and is therefore governed
by the law of that State.37 Although international law recognizes the existence of these legally
separate entities of the corporation, it does not determine criteria for the attribution of nationality,
which is a jurisdictional matter for each of the States concerned to decide.38 In addition, domestic
legal systems sometimes legally recognize these entities, without recognizing the multinational
corporation as a group. 39 If the legal personality of each entity depends on a domestic law, then a
multinational corporation (as a group composed of several entities) is not recognized by
international law and thus has no recognized legal existence.40

35

See Carreau and Juillard, supra note 31 at 10.
Kinley and Chambers, 2006, supra note 25, at 33.
37
Stephen Tully, International Corporate Legal Responsibility, 6 (Walters Kluwer Law & Business, 2012) [hereinafter
“Tully 2012”]; According to Tully, the nationality of the corporation can also be determined by: a) the location of the
registered office; b) the principal place of business; c) the dominant nationality of the management of the corporation;
d) the dominant nationality of the shareholders who control the corporation; or e) the dominant nationality of those
who control the current business, at 6-7. See also Pironon, supra note 34, at 1-39.
38
Id, at 7.
39
“Dans la plupart des ordres juridiques, le groupe constitue une entité de fait qui n’a ni nature ni régime juridique
précisément déterminés. Il n’en va différemment que dans quelques Etats tels l’Allemagne qui ont adopté un droit des
groupes […] ”. The French legislation does not ignore the “ group” because “ [s]a réalité économique est prise en
considération par certaines branches du droit qui, telles le droit commercial, le droit comptable, le droit bancaire, le
droit boursier, le droit de la concurrence, le droit pénal, le droit du travail ou encore le droit fiscal, tirent des
conséquences de la domination d’une société sur une autre ” in a different way according to these various branches of
law, see Pironon, supra note 34, at 4.
40
“More than 40 per cent of foreign affiliates worldwide have multiple “passports.” These affiliates are part of complex
ownership chains with multiple cross-border links involving on average three jurisdictions. The nationality of investors
in and owners of foreign affiliates is becoming increasingly blurred. “Multiple passport affiliates” are the result of
indirect foreign ownership, transit investment through third countries, and round-tripping. About 30 per cent of foreign
affiliates are indirectly foreign owned through a domestic entity; more than 10 per cent are owned through an
intermediate entity in a third country; and about 1 per cent are ultimately owned by a domestic entity. These types of
affiliates are much more common in the largest MNEs: 60 per cent of their foreign affiliates have multiple cross-border
ownership links to the parent corporation. The larger the MNEs, the greater the complexity of their internal ownership
structures. The top 100 MNEs in UNCTAD’s Transnationality Index have on average more than 500 affiliates each,
across more than 50 countries. They have 7 hierarchical levels in their ownership structure (i.e. ownership links to
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This prompts us to make another paradoxical observation: although various entities of a same
multinational group have legal personalities recognized in their respective countries and are
potentially liable there, they largely escape the control of States in their multinational dimension.41
They take advantage of legal loopholes and escape all responsibility, including at the international
level, where they are not recognized as either a subject of that law or in their multinational
dimension.
Furthermore, within the internal corporate network, the power holders are not necessarily natural
persons, but other abstract entities. There could be several parent companies within the same group.
Therefore, the “international corporate responsibility” approach allows for bypassing the complex
constructions of corporate organization charts. It also avoids distorting the attribution of liability
because the liability of the legal entity should not be strictly dependent on that of the natural person,
particularly when corporations conduct systematic human rights abuses across several
jurisdictions.
The only way to evoke the international responsibility of a multinational corporation is not to base
it on the legal status of each subsidiary, but rather to recognize it as having a unique international
legal personality that goes hand-in-hand with its cross-border actions. International law should
recognize multinational corporations as a group composed of a multitude of superior-subordinate
relationships and between subsidiaries within a single entity, but also of a multitude of nationalities.
Pointing the finger at the individual who, at the lowest level of the hierarchy, can be held
responsible when the crime is the product of a corporate dynamic42 may be complex when the
evidence may be sufficient to show that the corporation, as a legal entity, has indeed participated
in an international crime.
3. Constraint three: Traditional doctrine on state responsibility does not capture new forms
of corporate relationships
The law of state responsibility is central in international law; it results from the fact that states have
legal personality under international law and are considered to be principal bearers of international
obligations. Under the state responsibility law, the responsibility of a State can be engaged if the
affiliates could potentially cross 6 borders), they have about 20 holding companies owning affiliates across multiple
jurisdictions, and they have almost 70 entities in offshore investment hubs”, UNCTAD, World Investment Report
2016 : Investor nationality : policy challenges, at ix-x.
41
Saman Zia-Zarifi, Menno T. Kamminga, Liability of Multinational Corporations under International Law at 5
Massachusetts, Kluwer Law International, Boston (2000); see also UNCTAD, 2016 Rapport.
42
Michael J. Gilbert, Steve Russell, Globalization of Criminal Justice in the Corporate Context 38 Crime, Law Soc.
Change 211 (2002), According to the authors, individuals may come and go within the firm, but the pattern of values,
norms and expectations that characterize the entrepreneurial organization does not change. According to them, the
larger the corporation, the more difficult it is to transform it, especially in terms of its entrepreneurial culture, p. 219;
Desislava Stoitchkova, Towards Corporate Liability in International Criminal Law, at 111-112, Intersentia, Utrecht
(2010), [hereinafter “Stoitchkova 2010”], The Chiquita case makes the same point, see Factual Proffer, U.S.A. v.
Chiquita Brands International, (No. 07-055) (D.C. Circuit Mar. 19, 2007), March 19, 2007, ¶ 25.
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actions of its agents or otherwise actions of private actors can be attributable to the state. This
suppose that there is a potential link between the actions of private actors and the state. However,
contemporary armed conflicts have seen multiplication of non-state actors which cannot always
integrate the state responsibility doctrine.
At its 33rd International Conference, the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) highlighted the
transformation of modern warfare and noted the multiplication of armed non-state groups (ANSGs)
in contemporary armed conflicts. As the report states, “[a] central feature of the changing
geopolitical landscape of the last decade has been the proliferation of non-state armed groups. In
some of the most complex recent conflicts, analysts observed hundreds, if not thousands, of groups
engaging in armed violence.”43 The increase in armed non-state actors in recent conflicts has
yielded another dynamic related to corporate conduct—corporations increasingly recruit private
security and operate alongside ANSGs to continue their economic activities.
In its 2019 report, the Working Group on the use of mercenaries analyzed the “Relationship
between private military and security companies and the extractive industry from a human rights
perspective.”44 The Working Group noted that the most important client base today for private
military and security companies (PMSC) are the extractive industries and not states.45 The experts
highlighted that:
[G]iven the economic interests prevalent in the extractive industry and the environments
in which they operate, it is not surprising that security plays a fundamental role in the
exploitation of natural resources. Although a number of actors actually provide security
services to the extractive industry, their respective roles, responsibilities, and reporting
lines are not always legally defined and are rarely publicly disclosed.46
The Working Group raised the issue of the relationship between ANSGs that further obfuscates
any corporate responsibility:
[I]n some contexts, paramilitary groups and non-State armed actors may also be involved.
Transparency with regard to private security arrangements within the extractive industry
may be further complicated by the use in some regions of both formal private military
and security companies (that is, those registered and authorized to offer security services
in accordance with relevant national rules and regulations) and informal private security
providers (those operating without a license or with links to criminal entities).47

43
ICRC, International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts: recommitting to
protection in armed conflict on the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, 33IC/19/9.7 (Geneva: ICRC, 2019),
39.
44
See WGM, extractive report, supra note 4.
45
Id., ¶20.
46
Id., ¶.25.
47
Ibid.
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Other fact-finding bodies have raised the issue of corporations doing business with armed groups.48
I previously raised the issue of ANSGs’ need to sustain operations, including their finances and
militaries, that is often provided by business entities, particularly when ANSGs exercise state-like
functions or de facto authority.49
Some of the main obstacles for corporate accountability are opaque contractual and extra
contractual arrangements. For instance, in the extractive industry, it is “extremely difficult to
ascertain chains of command, responsibilities and levels of coordination among the different
security actors, and undermine transparency and monitoring efforts. Furthermore, it is usually
difficult to find public confirmation of the identity of subcontractors […].”50 This makes it very
difficult to establish the exact relationships, obligations, and ultimately, the responsible actors for
any human rights abuses. Importantly, it further demonstrates the limits of the state responsibility
doctrine which might not be applicable in all complex relationships between various non-state
actors.
B. Transitional justice limited by the narrow interpretation of corporate
obligations under international law
In times of armed conflict, several bodies of international law apply. International human rights
law and international humanitarian law (IHL) complement each other,51 as they both developed
from similar legal philosophy and ideologies.52 While there is still some debate about the
enforceability of human rights law in respect to corporations, there is nothing in IHL that prevents
it from applying to corporations that operate in the context of armed conflicts. IHL is the
predominant legal regime tailored to the exceptional circumstances of both international and noninternational armed conflict. IHL applies to state and non-state actors, regardless of their legal
status53 or extraneous considerations, such as the objective of the former or the ideology of the
48
U.N. Security Council, Letter dated 6 December 2019 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic
extended pursuant to resolution 2454 (2019) addressed to the President of the Security Council’, U.N. Doc. S/2019/930
(Dec 14, 2019), ¶¶ 144, 151–152, 156–157; UN Security Council, ‘Letter dated November 29, 2019, from the Panel
of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011) addressed to the President of the Security Council’,
U.N. Doc. S/2019/914 (Dec 9, 2019). See also, OHCHR, Joint Statement by independent United Nations human rights
experts on human rights responsibilities of armed non-State actors, (Feb 25, 20219), available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26797&LangID=E (last accessed May 3,
2021).
49
Jelena Aparac, Business and Armed Non-State Groups: Challenging the Landscape of Corporate (Un)accountability
in Armed Conflicts 5 270–275 Bus. & Human Rights J. (2020).
50
WGM, Extractive report, ¶ 59.
51
Hans-Peter Gasser, International humanitarian law and human rights in non-international armed conflict: Joint
venture or mutual exclusion ? 45 Ger. Yearb. Int’l L. 162 (2002).
52
Natalia Szablewska, Non State Actors and Human Rights in Non-International Armed Conflicts 32 S.A. Yearb. Int’l
L. 346 (2007) [ hereinafter “Szablewska, 2007”].
53
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Decision on preliminary
motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child recruitment), SCSL-2004-14-AR 72(E) (31 May 2004) ¶22; Kadic et al. v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), ¶ 239; Lutz Oette, Ilias Bantekas, International Human Rights Law and Practice
659, Cambridge University Press (2nd edition, 2016) [hereinafter “Oette and Bantekas, 2016”), Mamadou Hébié,
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latter. It constitutes an exception to the normative approach of public international law by not
requiring non-state actors to recognize international legal personality as a precondition to the
imposition of direct international obligations on them.54
1. Lack of corporate responsibility under the international human rights law framework
The legal relationship that concerns international human rights law is the vertical relationship
between individuals and States. Moreover, according to the triptych “respect, protect, and
sanction,” the State has positive obligations to guarantee the respect of human rights horizontally
between two private persons.55 Thus, even if individuals are deemed to have rights, the obligation
to guarantee these rights belongs to the State. John Ruggie translated these obligations into his
triptych “protect, respect, and remedy,” which is incumbent on States with regard to the behavior
of companies.56 The European Court of Human Rights has deepened the doctrine of positive
obligations of the State, which is at the heart of the horizontal effect of human rights and serves as
a tool to guarantee their respect between private actors.57
From a normative point of view, human rights have historically regulated the relationship between
an individual and a sovereign State. As a result, human rights are perceived as a body of
international law that protects the rights and freedoms of individuals against the arbitrariness of the
State. However, for human rights law to truly fulfill its protective function, it cannot ignore abuses
committed by corporations; protection cannot be based solely on the relationship of the individual
to a sovereign power because that power may be limited when corporate actors exercise their power
over individuals. Protection must be based on the idea that human rights are inherent to human

Chapitre 7 : L’implication des sociétés militaires privées dans les conflits armés contemporains et le droit international
humanitaire in Vincent Chetail eds., Permanence et mutation du droit des conflits armés 292, Bruylant, Bruxelles,
(2013), Yves Sandoz (eds.), Commentary on the Additional protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, ¶ 4444, at 1345; Jean-Marie Kamatali, The application of international
Human Rights Law in non-international Armed conflicts, from Rhetoric to Action 4 J. Int’l. Humanit. Leg. Stud. 233
(2013); Philip Alston (eds), Non-state actors and Human Rights at 197 (Oxford University Press, 2005); Cameron
and Chetail, 2013, supra note 21, at 379.
54
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 970, common art 3. US v Alfried Krupp, et al., United States
Military Tribunal III (1948), at 1352-1353.
55
In Europe, ECHR, Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 29392/95 (May 10, 2001) ¶ 73 ; Velásquez Rodríguez
v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, ¶ 172 (July 29, 1988), in Africa Purohit and Moore
v. Gambia, African Comm. on Human and Peoples' Rights, Merits, Decision, Communication no. 241/01 (May 29,
2003), ¶ 57. See also Kathia Martin Chenut Panorama en droit international des droits de l’homme in Kathia Martin
Chenut, René, De Quenaudon (eds.) Responsabilité sociétale des entreprises, la RSE saisie par le droit, perspectives
internes et internationales at 44, Pédone, Paris (2016), [hereinafter « Martin Chenut, 2016 »].
56
See Martin Chenut 2016, supra note 55, at 44.
57
See Karavias 2014, supra note 25, at 36.

37

VOL. 10 (2022)

beings.58 Therefore, the focus of this set of law is to protect the inherent right of individuals against
abuses, not the rights and obligations of a State59 which has the “power” to abuse.
If companies have direct obligations under international law, the concrete question is how to define
the scope of human rights obligations that can be enforced against them. If a multinational
corporation must respect certain obligations under international human rights law, must it also
guarantee compliance? Indeed, companies are not in a position to ensure the implementation of
human rights to the same degree as States. It is unrealistic to ask a corporation to guarantee a fair
trial, even in a territory it controls. The State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, grants concession
contracts to foreign companies. The State thus retains control of the territory. This does not
discharge it of its positive obligations to guarantee the protection of human rights and to prosecute
those who violate them. Concomitantly, according to Professor Steven R. Ratner, this relationship
between the corporation and the government (notably through concession contracts) expands the
number of obligations that can be enforced against companies in the field of human rights because
human rights obligations are simultaneously enforceable against companies whenever they are
imposed on the State.60According to Professor Andrew Clapham, there is a “paradigm shift” that
replaces the traditional view of state-non-state and public-private relations and imposes positive
obligations of international human rights law on non-state actors, including multinationals.61 This
is particularly the case when the corporation is invested with a public service mission or ensures
its execution, such as water management and supply.62 Dismantling the strict separation between
the private and the public reinforces the argument that human rights are applicable to companies,
even when they do not fulfill a public service mission.63

58

See UDHR, 1948, Preambles: “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights
of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. Whereas disregard
and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people […]every individual and every organ of society,
keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories
under their jurisdiction.”
59
See Karavias, 2014, supra note 25, at 19-21.
60
Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: a Theory of Legal Responsibility 111(3) Yale L. J. 497 (2001)
[hereinafter “Ratner 2001”].
61
Andrew Clapham, Silvia Danailov, Whiter the State of Human Rights Protection? New Ways to Hold Non-State
Actors Accountable, background paper for the International Council on Human Rights Policy (Geneva), June 1998.
62
See Oette and Bantekas, 2016, supra note 53, at 665.
63
Isabelle Fouchard, La souveraineté étatique à l’épreuve de l’autorégulation : le cas des entreprises militaires et de
sécurité privées in Kathia Martin Chenut, René, De Quenaudon (eds.) Responsabilité sociétale des entreprises, la RSE
saisie par le droit, perspectives internes et internationales 233-255, Pédone, Paris (2016), [hereinafter “Fouchard,
2016”].
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Consequently, human rights obligations do not require companies to guarantee economic and
social rights to individuals (which requires State action), but rather to protect certain rights such as
the right to life.64 The negative obligations of the corporation (not to violate human rights) do not
preclude a positive obligation on the part of the State to implement the conditions necessary to
guarantee all rights.65 While there is a growing doctrine arguing in favor of direct applicability of
international human rights law to corporate actors66, this is still not translated in law and practiced
by an enforcing mechanism.
2. Applicability of IHL obligations to corporations: a legal basis that could advance
transitional justice
Notwithstanding the obligations of States, IHL reinforces the theory of the direct applicability of
certain obligations to multinationals. Indeed, in IHL, it is not necessary to establish that an actor
has a legal personality before attributing obligations to it and making it responsible for violating
them.67 IHL has, so to speak, its own particular system, since it applies to “anyone engaged in the
conflict in any manner whatsoever.”68 Therefore, persons participating in hostilities, as well as
64

See Article 5-1 of the IPCPR ; see Oette and Bantekas, 2016, supra note 53, at 668; See Szablewska, 2007, supra
note 52, at 352, U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31, The nature of the general legal
obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004), ¶8 : “[…] the
positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected
by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application
between private persons or entities”; UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Paul Arenz, Thomas Röder et Dagmar
Röder vs. Germany, Communication no. 1138/2002), ¶8.5 (March 24, 2004).
65
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights creates rights for individuals that require state abstention
(not to violate the right to life), while the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires
state action to guarantee these rights (claim rights). The Commission for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
never referred to positive obligations in relation to the situation raised by the horizontal effect of human rights, since
these rights are already seen as positive in themselves. see Karavias 2014, supra note 25, at 45.
66
See also OHCHR, Joint Statement by independent United Nations human rights experts on human rights
responsibilities of armed non-State actors, supra note 48.
67
See art. 2 of the Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907 recognizing the resisting movements
(people who spontaneously take up arms), art. 1-4 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977 recognizing
peoples who are “fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist régime”, common art. 3
to Geneva Conventions from 1949 making reference to “Party to the conflict” and not the High Contracting Parties
and imposes human rights and international humanitarian law obligations directly on non-state actors, art. 1-1 of the
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 referring to “dissident armed forces or other organized armed
groups. All these actors are recognized as actors in armed conflicts with international obligations without having an
international or even internal legal personality. See also Oette and Bantekas, 2016, supra note 53, at. 660.
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See Cameron and Chetail 2013, supra note 21, at 353. According to the authors, this is the principle of effectiveness
of international humanitarian law, especially since the new conflicts no longer correspond to classic inter-state
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civilians, are bound by the rules of IHL.69 This is due to the fact that IHL aims to protect certain
categories of people, and it focuses on the character of the protected person, not the nature of the
perpetrator who violated the obligation.70 It follows that the duty bearers under this body of law
can also be legal persons.71 The most significant summary of this doctrine can be found in the
commentary of the Additional Protocol II:
[...] the commitment made by a State not only applies to the government but also to any
established authorities and private individuals within the national territory of that State
and certain obligations are therefore imposed upon them. The extent of rights and duties
of private individuals is therefore the same as that of the rights and duties of the State.
Although this argument has occasionally been questioned in legal literature, the validity
of the obligation imposed upon insurgents has never been contested.72
From the moment IHL is directly applicable to companies, the question of its legal personality in
international law no longer arises. Indeed, by providing that IHL also applies to non-state actors
(including economic actors),73 this law ignores the traditional debate as to whether or not the
69
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v. Sam Hinga Norman, Appeals Chamber, Decision on preliminary motion based on lack of jurisdiction (child
recruitment), SCSL-2004-14-AR 72(E) (May 31, 2004), para.22; Kadic et al. v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
Para.239; See Oette and Bantekas, 2016, supra note 53, at 659; Heibe, 2013, supra note 69 at 292; Jean-Marie
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multinational corporation is a subject of international law. Moreover, the Geneva Conventions are
directly binding on all participants in the armed conflict, as the abundant case law of the two
international criminal tribunals show,74 not all of them are subjects of international law.
The doctrine of international obligations directly enforceable against individuals75 can be applied
by analogy to companies as powerful private actors with a strong presence on the international
scene.76 Indeed, there is nothing in international law to indicate that the individual should be
distinguished from the corporation. It can even be argued that the analysis applicable to individuals
can be a fortiori applicable to companies, notably because of their structure that, as a legal person,
resembles the two other subjects of international law: States and international organizations.77
Furthermore, the distinction between a direct and indirect obligation is sometimes conflated with
primary and secondary rules of international law. The assumption that international obligations
regulate corporate behavior indirectly because they refer to domestic law to ensure compliance is
thus incorrect. In fact, if an international obligation prescribes a behavior to be adopted by the
corporation, it is a primary obligation of international law. It is the secondary rule that regulates
the modality of the corporation’s responsibility and compliance if this primary rule has been
violated.78 In general, according to the theory of the duplication of the role of the State, the primary
rule of international law prohibits conduct, while it is up to national courts to sanction the prohibited
act.79 For instances, primary rules, if violated by individuals, trigger their individual criminal
liability (secondary rules) which is well recognized since the Nuremberg trials. In the case of
corporations, it is precisely the secondary rule, namely the theory of corporate criminal liability
which is missing in international law. International criminal law can be adapted to the context of
corporations, probably even more so than the numerous primary rules of human rights law that are
Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 ¶79; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule", Appeals
Chamber, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1 ¶ 98 ( Oct 2, 1995);
ICTR, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Chamber, Judgement, ICTR-96-4¶ 608 (Sept 2, 1998).
74
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international criminal courts for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The International criminal tribunal
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humanity; see ICTR, Prosecutor v. Musema, Appeals Chamber, Judgement, ICTR- 96-13-A (Nov 16, 2001). The same
Tribunal raised the question of the responsibility of legal persons but did not have the jurisdiction over them. ICTR,
The Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al, Trial Chamber, Judgement, ICTR-99-52-T (Dec 3, 2003) ¶ 8.
75
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more recently, individuals […] ».
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77
See Karavias, 2014, supra note 25 at 7 (discussing that international organizations have been recognized as subjects
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See Ratner, 2001, supra note 60, at 492-496; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Direct vs. Indirect obligations of Corporations
under International Law 43 Colum. J. Transnatl. L. 933 (2005).
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enforceable on States.80 Since its inception, it is both international criminal law and the courts that
have advanced the theory of international criminal liability of corporations.81 Recently, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon specified that international law creates direct obligations on legal entities:
“We consider that international human rights standards and the positive obligations arising therein
are equally applicable to legal entities.”82
States have traditionally refrained from codifying corporate behavior through international treaties
that are perceived to compete with their sovereignty prerogatives. At the same time, the States have
not hesitated to confer State inherent functions to the private corporate entities.83 Yet, it is by
exercising their sovereignty that States can decide to create obligations directly incumbent on
companies and strengthen the protection of rights by recognizing corporate international
responsibility. This approach is not new, and States have regulated corporate conduct in the context
of international investment law84 and European law by recognizing the “direct effect” of the Treaty
of Rome to corporations.85 The willingness of States to impose direct obligations on companies is
80

See Ratner, 2001, supra note 60 at 494.
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But paradoxically, states are not hesitating to delegate more and more intrinsically state functions to private actors
cf. Montreux Document (2008); Fouchard, 2016, supra note 62, at 233-255. See also the Human Rights Council
resolution 36/11 from September 28, 2017; the Second session of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group
to elaborate the content of an international regulatory framework, without prejudging the nature thereof, relating to
the activities of private military and security companies (April 26 to 30, 2021) documents available at:
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IGWG_PMSCs/Pages/Session2.aspx (last accessed May 1, 2021).
84
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, known as the
Washington Convention, convention offers companies the possibility to initiate arbitration proceedings before the
ICSID, which is an international procedure. By its Article 25, the Convention creates the center for international dispute
settlement related to investment (ICSID).
85
In its landmark cases of the 1970s, the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified that the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome, an international treaty of public international law which established the European Economic
Community, apply directly to companies. CJCE, B.N.O. Walrave and L.J.N. Koch v. Association Union cycliste
internationale, Judgment of the Court of 12 December 1974, Case 36-74. CJCE, NV Algemene Transport-en Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend & Loos contre Administration fiscale néerlandaise, Judgement of the Court of 5 February
1963, Case 26-62.
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also illustrated by environmental law.86 However, as with other branches of international law, the
sanction for their violation (the secondary rules) refers to traditional procedures of liability before
domestic courts or state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act.
Regardless of the progress of the corporate liability doctrine, the traditional approach to
international law, in particular by international institutions and courts, fosters corporate impunity
for grave abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law.

II.

The current approach to the regulatory regime favors corporate impunity

Any process of establishing a corporate international responsibility is divided into two stages.
First, it is necessary to gather information and document the human rights abuses and violence
perpetrated by corporations.87 This is the most crucial step in the whole process. Yet, it is also the
most difficult one from a practical perspective and the most under-researched one from a scholarly
perspective. Documentation is the key step in the process because the findings of the investigation
may or may not lead to trials. Additionally, the findings should be presented in court (domestic or
international). Multinational corporations who may contribute to the sustainability of wars and
military capacity of parties to a conflict increasingly transcend borders with their multilayered and
transnational operations, thus evading all jurisdictions.
A. Lack of documentation and accountability due to the traditional approach
Due to the gradual inclusion of IHL in the wider UN system,88 fact-finding and investigative
mechanisms often have a mandate to investigate violations of both branches of international law:
international human rights law and IHL.89 These international investigative bodies were established
by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council (and its predecessor,
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See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels, Nov 29, 1969), art. 3: “The
owner of a ship at the time of an incident, or where the incident consists of a series of occurrences at the time of the
first such occurrence, shall be liable for any pollution damage caused by oil which has escaped or been discharged
from the ship as a result of the incident”; see also Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (Basel, March 22, 1989), art. 4-3: “The Parties consider that illegal traffic in
hazardous wastes or other wastes is criminal.”
87
See also Jelena Aparac, Gaps in Corporate Liability: Limited Investigations of Corporate Crimes in Armed Conflicts
23 Int’l Community L. Rev. 486-502 (2021).
88
The International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission provided for in Article 90 of Additional Protocol I has
never functioned; Additional Protocol I, Art. 90. See official website of the Commission:
https://www.ihffc.org/index.asp?Language=FR&page=home (last accessed May 13, 2021).
89
The inclusion of IHL as a basis for investigations has considerable advantages. IHL has a wider acceptability (in
terms of the rate of ratification of conventions) than human rights instruments. Furthermore, states may, under certain
conditions, derogate from certain human rights in the event of declared war or internal disturbance, whereas IHL
applies during the entire armed conflict. Moreover, it provides clarification, notably concerning the rules relating to
judicial guarantees, means, and methods of warfare.
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the Commission on Human Rights), the Secretary-General, and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights.

1. UN–Security Council and General Assembly have potential to capture the role of
corporations in conflicts and crimes through their documentation
At the outset, the UN’s role, albeit limited, in the enforcement of IHL was expressly recognized by
Article 89 of Additional Protocol I, which allows it to act in cooperation with States in the event
of serious violations of this Protocol and of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.90 In recent times, the
proliferation of international investigations and mechanisms reflects not only the worsening
contexts of armed conflict, but also a desire to document violence with a view to act when a
domestic or international jurisdiction is granted jurisdiction to conduct a trial.
The investigations conducted under the Security Council mandate are linked to its evolving
interpretation of a “threat to international peace and security,” which is not defined by the Charter.91
Thus, its interpretation depends on the interests and political considerations of States. During the
Cold War, the Security Council tended to interpret this notion in a restrictive manner by excluding
questions of human rights and international humanitarian law.92 Since the end of the Cold War, it
has adopted a broader interpretation of the notion of threat to international peace and security in
order to progressively include violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. This
makes it possible to justify measures taken on the basis of Chapter VI or VII.93 The establishment
of commissions of inquiry by the Security Council is therefore conditional on threats to
international peace and security, which must be established on the basis of Article 39 of the Charter.
In addition to commissions of inquiry, the Security Council can also take measures to maintain or
restore international peace and security by adopting the sanction regime set forth in Article 41 of
the Charter.

90
Art. 89 of the Additional protocol I: “In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the
High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in
conformity with the United Nations Charter.” The role is limited in that the UN cannot develop IHL norms and can
only implement them. On the other hand, the UN can only act in the context of serious violations, cf. Slvain Vité, Les
procédures internationales d’établissement des faits dans la mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire, at 5657, Bruylant, Brussels (1999) [Hereinafter “Vité”]
91
Jean-Pierre Cot, Alain Pellet, Mathias Forteau, La Charte des Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article, 3ème
édition Economica, Paris, vol I et II. (2005). For the commentary of the art. 39 see at 1131-1170.
92
Ludovic Hennebel, Helen Tigroudja, Traité de droit international des droits de l’homme, Pédone, Paris (2016)
[hereinafter “Hennebel and Tigroudja”] at 251; See Vité, supra note 90, at 163
93
Hennebel and Tigroudja supra note 92, at 251; See Vité, supra note 90, at 163-166. Although his first investigation
dates back to 1979 concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it was with the Commission of Experts for the former
Yugoslavia that he expressly included widespread violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the
former Yugoslavia as constituting threats to international peace and security, U.N. Security Council Res 780, U.N.Doc.
S/RES/780 (Oct 6, 1992).
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Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council and General Assembly have made increasing
use of economic sanctions in order to protect international peace and security.94 When the Security
Council takes sanctions measures, such as arms embargoes, travel bans, or financial restrictions, it
requests States to take measures to sanction corporations.95 Therefore, these sanctions are mainly
directed against States.96 The UN is an intergovernmental organization governed by the
international public law, and as such, its political organs address only States without directly
addressing the companies themselves. However, as the international humanitarian and security
environment has evolved over the past decades, the sanction regime has increasingly affected nonstate actors directly.97
Each of these sanction regimes is administered by a sanctions committee with varying mandates.
The committees, as part of their mandate, may designate individuals and entities that meet the
criteria as defined in the relevant resolutions.98 To this end, they established a list on which
companies can be included, along with individuals and other entities, in order to better guide states
on the implementation of the embargo. Thus, each committee can include companies on the list,
not because of violations of the embargo resolutions, but because the Council has identified them
as perpetrators of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.
This is all the more the case if the Council links the companies’ activities to armed conflict, as it
did in the context of the violence in the Central African Republic in 2013.99 It should be noted that
of all the situations in which the Council has ordered an investigation, it is only for the Central
African Republic that it has explicitly referred to the link between economic activities and
conflict.100 Other reports provide specific details regarding the trafficking of natural resources and
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Art. 11, 25, 39 and 41 UN Charter.
It creates obligations on States.
96
See Ratner 2001, supra note 60, at 483.
97
See for South Africa, G.A. Resolution 2671(XXV), The policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa,
A/RES/2671(Dec 8, 1970); for Iraq, U.N. Security Council, Resolution 986, U.N. Doc S/RES/986 (April 14, 1995). It
should be noted that in some cases the embargo is aimed directly at companies. Sandra C. Wisner, Criminalizing
Corporate Actors for Exploitation of Natural Resources in Armed Conflict: UN Natural Resources Sanctions
Committees and the International Criminal Court 16-5 J. Int’l Crim. Justice 963 (2018), sanction measures must be
transposed into national legislation before being applied to companies; Tully 2005, supra note 26, at 494.
98
See S.C. Res 1533, U.N. Doc S/RES/1533 (March 12, 2004) regarding Democratic Republic of Congo, Security
Council creates a Sanction Committee to identify individuals and entities who violated the embargo; See also S.C.
Res 1493, U.N. Doc S/RES/1493, (July 28, 2003) regarding military assistance. For Libya see S.C. Res 1970 U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1970 (February 26, 2011) ¶17, where Council decides « that all Member States shall freeze without delay
all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or designated by the Committee
established pursuant to ¶ 24 below, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities
owned or controlled by them, and decides further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets,
or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities
within their territories, to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities listed in Annex II of this resolution or
individuals designated by the Committee.” For Afghanistan, see S.C. 1988 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1988 (June 17, 2011).
99
S.C. Res. 1653, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1653 (Jan 26, 2006); S.C. Res 1625, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1625 (Sept 14, 2005).
100
Id., the Security Council « Condemns the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the CAR which contributes to
the perpetuation of the conflict and underlines the importance of bringing an end to these illegal activities, including
by applying the necessary pressure on the armed groups, traffickers, and all other actors involved” [our italics].
95
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the behavior of companies,101 or other commercial entities, in the conduct of conflicts, including
arms trafficking.102
Besides sanctions imposed on the identified natural and legal persons, in cases where there is an
international or internationalized tribunal already established, the Security Council may, by virtue
of the powers conferred by the Charter, refer persons to such a tribunal in case of a threat to
international peace and security.103 This could be the case for natural persons and legal persons
whenever courts’ jurisdictions would allow prosecutions of legal entities. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that, to date, the Security Council has not referred any corporate director to the ICC for their
involvements in international crimes.
Outside of the sanction regime, UN political organs have the power of investigation, which gives
them insight into the situations on which they must act. Security Council resolutions show a
progressive tendency to relate international peace and security to economic activities that stimulate
armed conflict104 which are not always accompanied by sanction regime. The International
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission established by Additional Protocol I105 can only
investigate in the context of international armed conflicts and is subject to acceptance by all parties
to the conflict of which reports should remain confidential. However, the investigative mechanisms
established by the Security Council when they are mandated to investigate IHL violations can
palliate the defaults of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. Whenever the
Council refers to IHL, it can broaden its scope of action and ask all parties to the conflict, including
non-state actors, to respect this set of rules.106 Consequently, if IHL also applies to multinational
corporations and the Security Council is authorized to implement IHL by Article 89 of Additional
Protocol I,107 there is nothing to legally prevent the Council from addressing companies directly
and extending the mandate of investigations to their alleged abusive conduct. Indeed, in linking the
trafficking of natural resources to the armed conflict in the Central African Republic, the Security
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U.N. Security Council, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc.
S/2018/531 (June 4, 2018), ¶134.
102
Id., at ¶¶. 186, 187, 189, 193, 195, 201.
103
S. C. Res. 1638, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1638 (Nov 11, 200), introduction 4 and ¶1; S. C. Res. 1688, U. N. Doc.
S/RES/1688 (June16, 2006), ¶¶ 1-7.
104
S. C. Res. 1173, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1173 (June 12, 1998), ¶¶11 and following (situation in Angola, first resolution
of the SC on the link between diamonds and armed conflicts); S.S. Res 1237, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1237 (May 7, 1999),
¶ 8 (situation in Angola, first resolution in relation to diamonds and private actors); S. C. Res. 1343, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1343, (March 7, 2001), ¶¶ 7 and following (situation in Sierra Leone, traffic of arms and diamonds through Liberia).
105
Art. 90 of the Additional Protocol I. The Commission has, in fact, already interpreted Art. 90 of Additional Protocol
I to extend its competence to non-international armed conflicts with the consent of the parties to the conflicts, see:
http://www.ihffc.org/Files/ihffc_brochure_2015_final_thilo.cha.pdf (last accessed December, 22, 2020).
106
S. C. Res. 2127, (Dec 5, 2013) (situation in CAR) introduction 4, ¶¶. 17, 19, 20, 22, 23; S.C. Res. 1564, S/RES/1564
(Sept 18, 2004) (Soudan-Darfour), at 11, ¶¶ 4, 5, 10, 12; or when the Council authorizes an investigation into any
alleged violation of IHL, regardless of the identity of the perpetrators, S.C. Note by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/25198 (June 9, 1993) (Liberia), introduction 3.
107
See Vité, supra note 90, at 56-57.
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Council referred to “all other actors,”108 which may include companies that directly, or through
their supply chain, stimulate the conflict.
In this regard, it is interesting to note that the commission’s mandate for Liberia made no reference
to the exploitation of natural resources, although these elements were extensively analyzed in the
judgment of the former head of state, Charles Taylor:
The Prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that diamonds were
delivered to the Accused by Sam Bockarie directly, as well as indirectly through
intermediaries, such as Eddie Kanneh and Daniel Tamba (a.k.a. Jungle) from
February 1998 to July 1999, and that these diamonds were delivered to the
Accused for the purpose of obtaining arms and ammunition from him.109
For its part, the General Assembly, through its resolutions, can point out key obstacles in the field
of the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the Assembly has been able to
pronounce itself based on the link between “international transfer and international production of
conventional arms [...] in illicit channels that can influence the scourges of war and have a direct
impact on international peace and security.”110 It should be noted that the Assembly is directed
only at States, and it also takes into account the role that non-state actors play in the illegal
trafficking of arms.111 In addition, the Assembly has recognized the role of corporations in the
trafficking of “blood diamonds” in armed conflicts.112
While both Security Council and General Assembly recognized on several occasions the link that
may exist between corporations (economic actors) and armed conflict, they never examined the
role of companies nor did they take any further actions.
2. The OHCHR fact-finding reports do not document the role of corporations in the theater
of war
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S/RES/2127, ¶ 16.
SCSL, Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone v. Charles Ghankay Taylor,
Judgment, case no. SCSL-03-1-T (May 18, 2012), ¶ 5948. See also ¶¶ 5839, 5841, 5948. Note the exclusion of the
mentioned diamond and arms companies from investigation and prosecution in this case.
110
G. A. Res. 46/36’ H- International transfer of arms, U.N Doc. A/RES/46/36 (Dec 6, 1991), at 74 and following.
111
In its resolutions, the Assembly can address non-state actors directly, see G. A. Res. 54/185. Question of human
rights in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/185 (Feb 29, 2000), ¶4 where the Assembly “calls upon the Taliban to
fulfill their stated commitment to cooperate in urgent investigations of these heinous crimes with a view to bringing
those responsible to justice” and ¶10: «Urges all the Afghan parties, in particular the Taliban, to bring to an end without
delay all violations of human rights against women and girls and to take urgent measures to ensure […]”.
112
G. A. Res. 55/56, The role of diamonds in fueling conflict: breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough
diamonds and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and settlement of conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/56, (Jan
29, 2001), introduction 5.
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The UN Human Rights Council may deploy independent fact-finding missions or support those
established by other UN bodies. These commissions are mandated to conduct independent
investigations into serious human rights violations in specific contexts.113
Over the past decades, the Human Rights Council has been confronted with increasingly complex
situations of violence and armed conflict. Thus, the mandates of the commissions are not
homogeneous and “their wording may vary considerably depending on the situation under
investigation, the nature of the violations, and the purpose of the investigation.”114 One factor that
is becoming increasingly common, however, is that investigations are primarily deployed in armed
conflicts where there is a need to assess the most serious violations of international law.
Consequently, where appropriate, inquiry commissions and fact-finding missions may refer to
international humanitarian law.115 For example, the original mandate of the Commission of Inquiry
on Syria included only references to human rights.116 When the country context evolved into an
armed conflict, the Council expanded the Commission’s mandate to include IHL.117 The inclusion
of IHL as a reference in its investigations brings greater credibility to the reports produced.118
Indeed, the monitoring of human rights violations is only limited to the positive obligations of
113

U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. S-15/1, Situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, A/HRC/RES/S15/1 (March 3, 2011), ¶1 where Council “[e]xpresses deep concern at the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and
strongly condemns the recent gross and systematic human rights violations committed in that country, including the
indiscriminate armed attacks against civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture of peaceful
demonstrators, some of which may also amount to crimes against humanity.” See also U.N. Human Rights Council,
Res. S-16/1 (in A/66/53 at 27-29) (April 29, 2011), the current human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in
the context of recent events, para. 1 where the Council “condemns the use of lethal violence against peaceful protesters
by the Syrian authorities and the hindrance of access to medical treatment, urges the Government of the Syrian Arab
Republic to immediately put an end to all human rights violations, protect its population and respect fully all human
rights and fundamental freedoms […].”
114
OHCHR, Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-finding Missions on International Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law: Guidance and Practice at 10, (New York and Geneva, 2015), [hereinafter “OHCHR Guidance”].
115
It is worth recalling the distinction between grave breaches of IHL and serious violations of IHL. With regard to
grave breaches of IHL, States have a treaty obligation to prosecute or extradite perpetrators of violence. Grave breaches
apply only in IACs. Serious violations of IHL oblige states to take the necessary measures to bring them to an end; art.
49/50/129/146, ¶ 3 common to all four articles of Geneva Conventions 1949. In the NICs, there is no real distinction
between serious violations and grave breaches of IHL; See Theodor Meron, The international criminalization of
internal atrocities 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 554-577 (1995) See also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), ¶¶ 87-93. IT-94-1, (Oct 2, 1995)
116
U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. S-17/1, The Human Right Situation in the Syria Arab Republic, A/HRC/S-17/1
¶¶1- 2. (Aug 22, 2011).
117
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. 21/26, The human rights situation in the Syria Arab Republic, A/HRC/RES/21/26
(Oct 17, 2012), ¶10 where Council « Stresses the need to follow up on the report of the commission of inquiry and to
conduct an international, transparent, independent and prompt investigation into abuses and violations of
international law, with a view to hold to account those responsible for violations and abuses, including those that may
amount to crimes against humanity and war crimes […] ». The Council extends the mandate to war crimes, which
allows for the assessment of serious violations of IHL. However, the Council does not decide on the nature of national
or international armed conflicts, given the complexity of the relations between the parties to the conflict.
118
U.N. Human Rights Council Res. S-28/1, Violations of international law in the context of large-scale civilian
protests in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-28/1 (May 18, 2018), ¶1;
U.N. Human Rights Council Res 36/31, Human rights, technical assistance and capacity-building in Yemen, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/RES/36/31 (Sept 29, 2017), ¶ 1 where Council “[c]ondemns the ongoing violations and abuses of human rights
and violations of international humanitarian law in Yemen.”
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States. The introduction of IHL as a legal basis for monitoring makes it possible to assess the
compliance of all parties to the conflict.119As a result, these reports gain in impartiality insofar as
they also monitor compliance with international law by non-state actors.120
Where a commission does not have a mandate to investigate violations of IHL, it may nevertheless
identify the crime against humanity121 as an international crime. This approach supports the
doctrine that certain violations are universally unacceptable.122 Therefore, in addition to the fact
that commissions of inquiry and fact-finding missions are often mandated to investigate violations
of international human rights law and IHL, the finding that international crimes have taken place
in the territories covered by their mandates makes it legally possible to investigate abuses
committed directly or in complicity by multinational corporations.
Limited by time and logistical constraints, the fact-finding missions under the HRC mandate focus
on systematic aspects of violence, thus excluding single incidents which are only considered to the
extent that they reveal a certain pattern of violent behavior. This makes it possible to recognize
patterns in a given conflict and to label acts linked to given categories of perpetrators, groups, or
institutions as “politics of violence.”123 In countries where armed conflict is regularly fueled by
corporate activities, it is essential to investigate this type of behavior and understand root causes of
war, when it is identified as recurrent by multinational corporations.124 However, the Human Rights
Council does not have a mandate to preserve international peace and security. Therefore, linking
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Common art. 3 to Geneva Conventions, 1949, art. 1 of the Additional Protocol II. The obligation to respect and
ensure respect for IHL (limited to common Article 3) also rests on non-State actors, See Vité, supra note 88, at 30.
120
OHCHR Guidance, supra note 114, at 16. The Guidance refer to the Commission of Inquiry on Libya : “Non-State
actors in Libya, in particular the authorities and forces of the National Transitional Council [NTC], cannot formally
become parties to the international human rights treaties and are thus not formally given obligations under the treaties.
Although the extent to which international human rights law binds non-State actors remains contested as a matter of
international law, it is increasingly accepted that where non-State groups exercise de facto control over a territory, they
must respect fundamental human rights of persons in that territory. The Commission has taken the approach that, as
NTC has been exercising de facto control over territory akin to that of a governmental authority, the Commission will
also examine allegations of human rights violations committed by NTC force”, U.N. Human Rights Council, “Report
of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international human rights law in the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (Jan 12, 2012), ¶ 62.
121
U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, A/HRC/39/63 (Aug 8, 2018), ¶8: «
The law applicable to the work of the Commission, namely international human rights law and international criminal
law, has also remained the same […]. Over the past year, there have been no new developments pointing to the
existence of an armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law would apply. Having decided to
place greater emphasis on economic and social rights, the Commission based its legal analyses on the relevant
instruments to which Burundi is a party. »
122
Steve Wilkinson, Standards of proof in international humanitarian and human rights fact-finding and inquiry
commissions, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian law and Human Rights, Geneva, at 52. (2012)
[hereinafter “Wilkinson”].
123
Ibid.
124
A particular example can be given with the OHCHR report on the DRC. The Mapping Report, which is the result
of a survey conducted from 1993 to 2003, analyzes behaviors that are particularly present in the Congo conflict, such
as sexual violence. See HCDH-MONUC, Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of
human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010, [hereinafter « DRC Mapping Report »].
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corporate crimes to armed conflicts is not an objective of the commissions’ mandate. The Council
focuses on the systematic abuses that are part of the conflict dynamics, as the OHCHR Mapping
Report found in relation to the situation in Democratic Republic of Congo.125
Commissions may be mandated to investigate those responsible for violations and abuses126 and
they can formulate recommendations to States. If the reports identify companies and national
legislation provides this possibility of trials against corporations, fact-finding can be a fundamental
documentation tool for dealing with the past through domestic proceedings, as suggests by the
Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar:
[I]nternational law also permits States to hold corporation officials criminally liable
for their direct acts or omissions and for involvement with others in crimes under
international law, if they aid, abet or otherwise assist in genocide, crimes against
humanity and war crimes. It is particularly relevant to the situation in Myanmar that
these modes of criminal liability can arise when business officials engage in acts or
omissions that assist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a crime.
This can include financial assistance and the provision of goods, information and
services, including banking and communications services. If businesses rely on the
services or resources of the States or encourage the State to provide it with services
and resources, with the knowledge that these services might result in crimes under
international law, the relevant business officials risk criminal liability.127
Commissions and fact-finding missions can provide judicial proceedings with crucial evidence of
serious violations of international law.128 By providing analysis of the root causes of conflicts and
violations, commissions of inquiry could contribute to transitional justice and enable victims to
obtain justice, reparations, and even guarantees of non-repetition, thereby contributing to
reconciliation efforts and lasting peace. Although OHCHR fact-finding and inquiry commissions
have incredible potential to document corporate abuses to date, there have been very limited
investigations into corporate abuses, Myanmar Commission and South Sudan Commissions being
notable exceptions.129 Furthermore, there are no investigations of corporations based in the Global
North or any legal repercussions on the domestic level towards those same corporations for their
abuses in the Global South.
3. Corporate misconduct documented by Special procedures of the OHCHR
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Id., ¶733. The report also identified the role of multinational corporations in fueling the conflict.
HRC Res 21/26, supra note 115, ¶10.
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U.N. Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, The Economic Interests
of the Myanmar Military, A/HRC/42/CRP.3 ¶ 43 (Sept12, 2019).
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OHCHR Guidance, supra note 114 at 7.
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HRC, Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, Human rights violations and related economic crimes in the
Republic of South Sudan, A/HRC/48/CRP.3 (Sept 23 2021).
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The Human Rights Council has absorbed an institution created by the Commission on Human
Rights called “Special Procedures.”130 It is a mechanism composed of Special Rapporteurs,
Independent Experts, and Working Groups that have a country or thematic mandate to monitor
human rights across all regions of the world. In order to fulfill their mandate, the mandate holders
carry out activities, such as studies, advice on technical cooperation at the country level or the
production of reports, thematically or by country. However, with regard to corporate activities, the
main focus is on the possibility of responding to individual complaints through “communications.”
Due to the State-centric nature of the human rights system, communications are, first and foremost,
addressed to States on the basis of their territorial jurisdiction. This is also explained by the
effective capacity to protect human rights and to prosecute those suspected of violations that States
are supposed to have.131 In practice, this translates to an official communication in the form of a
diplomatic letter addressed to the permanent mission based in Geneva requesting information and
observations on the allegation and, if necessary, to take preventive or investigative measures.
Communications also consist of an intervention with the corporation concerned following
allegations of human rights violations. Today, this is the only mechanism at the international level
that can directly address corporate human rights and IHL abuses. In this regard, two Working
Groups are particularly engaged in the area of corporate responsibility: the Working Group on
mercenaries with the mandate to monitor private military and security companies (PMSC) and the
Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, which are responsible for communicating directly with companies when they are
accused of being involved in human rights violations. Indeed, the independent experts of the
Special Procedures have already addressed requests for clarification directly from companies on
situations concerning reprisals against migrant workers committed by private companies due to
complaints filed by the victims for inhumane working conditions,132 or arbitrary detention and
abuses of criminal procedure against environmental rights defenders denouncing mining
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Since their inception in 1967, the Special Procedures have been widely regarded as one of the pillars of human
rights at the United Nations. Their rapid development in the 1990s has been one of the most significant changes in the
UN's human rights programs; see Janusz Symonides, Human rights: international protection, monitoring, enforcement
49-50, Routledge, London (2003).
131
See OHCHR Joint Communication, Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises; the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and
consequences; and the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, AL PNG
2/2017 (Sept 22, 2017) on sexual violence in mining companies in Papua New Guinea; OHCHR, Joint Communication,
Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises; the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences and the Working Group
on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice, OL CAN 3/2017 (Sept 25, 2017).
132
OHCHR, Joint communication, Mandates of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders; the Special
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, including its
causes and consequences; and the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women and children, AL
OTH 15/2018 (May 10, 2018).

51

VOL. 10 (2022)

projects,133 or when corporations are involved in the extractive industry and military trainings.134
The corporation addressed in the communication may respond to the allegations, but the procedure
ends here. The allegation letters are sealed for 60 days, after which time they become public and
can be used for advocacy or documentation in other proceedings.
B. Corporations have rights but no corresponding responsibility before
international courts.
Binding international legal instruments have expressly confirmed that corporations have rights
guaranteed by international law.135 Corporations can also enjoy the jus standi before international
courts and tribunals including defending their own “human rights,” while the victims of corporate
abuses cannot bring claims for human rights committed by those corporations before those same
courts. In addition, in order to access international or regional courts, the applicant must have
exhausted domestic remedies.136 Exhaustion of domestic remedies is a rule of customary
international law137 that reflects the complementary or subsidiary nature of human rights courts.
States are responsible for ensuring that rights are respected. Generally, the condition for the
exhaustion of domestic remedies is the exhaustion of complaints proceedings.138 While the
applicant has the free choice of seeking legal remedies, this fundamental principle must still allow
133
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the State to remedy the alleged violation internally. This presupposes that the remedy is adequate
and useful.139
1. Corporate jus standi before international human rights courts
According to Article 34 of the European Convention on Human Rights, individual applications can
be filed by non-governmental organizations.140 It is in this category that companies will be
classified in order to access the Court. The first version of the Convention referred to applications
by “any legal person.” In later drafts, the terminology evolved and eventually the term “nongovernmental organization” was adopted.141 There is no indication, however, that this final
regulation was intended to exclude corporations from the scope of the Convention. Indeed, since
the first Sunday Times case,142 there have been many other significant cases brought before the
Court by corporations seeking to protect their “human rights”. In this respect, it is worth noting
that there has been an increase in the number of cases brought before the European Court of Human
Rights where the Court has recognized the applicability of human rights to corporations.
Corporation are an abstract entity. Consequently, the question arises as to how to identify the exact
rights to which a corporation may be entitled. The list is probably not exhaustive, but the procedural
rights seem easily applicable to corporations.143 Beyond these rights, the question becomes more
complex because of the difficulty of reconciling the provisions of the text with the interests of the
corporation. In the case of Autronic AG v. Switzerland, the ECHR goes further than just the right
to private property recognized to corporations:
[I]n the Court’s view, neither Autronic AG’s legal status as a limited corporation nor
the fact that its activities were commercial nor the intrinsic nature of freedom of
expression can deprive Autronic AG of the protection of Article 10 (art. 10). The
Article (art. 10) applies to "everyone,” whether natural or legal persons.144
It is surprising to note that the European Court of Human Rights goes beyond the simple protection
of the right to private property; it extends the protection of corporate rights to other rights, such as
the right to a fair trial or freedom of expression.145 The provisions relating to non-discrimination
or the right to respect for private and family life are somewhat controversial,146 as it is difficult to
139
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grant these rights to an abstract entity such as a corporation. On the other hand, there seems to be
a consensus on the non-enforceability of rights that are particularly attached to the very nature of
human beings (e.g., right to life, prohibition of torture).147
By referring to its own dynamic interpretation, the Court is progressively extending the application
of the Convention to corporations:
[T]he Court reiterates that the Convention is a living instrument which must be
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions […]. [With regards to] the rights
secured to companies by the Convention, it should be pointed out that the Court has
already recognized a corporation's right under Article 41 to compensation for nonpecuniary damage sustained as a result of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
[…]. Building on its dynamic interpretation of the Convention, the Court considers
that the time has come to hold that in certain circumstances, the rights guaranteed by
Article 8 of the Convention may be construed as including the right to respect for a
corporation's registered office, branches or other business premises […].148
This approach by ECHR raises the question of how far the Court will go in the dynamic
interpretation of its own cases and which rights will it include.149 Can the “humanization of
corporations”150 go so far as to recognize rights, such as the right to life of corporations, despite
the controversies this may present?
The American Convention on Human Rights provides that various entities may lodge a complaint
with the Court.151 But the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has not developed its reasoning
in the same way as its European counterpart. In the absence of explicit recognition of the possibility
for corporations to file an application before the Court, it has based its jurisprudence on the “rights”
recognized to corporations.152 The Inter-American Court has been seized with cases allowing
shareholders to pursue protection of interests in lieu of the corporation. In the 2002 landmark case,
Cantos v. Argentina, the owner of a large corporation and its principal shareholder petitioned the
Commission, and then the Court, for indirect protection of his companies after suffering losses as
well as accounting and administrative seizure. In response to Argentina’s argument that the case
Ouest and Sacer, respectively located in Colmar, Mérignac and Boulogne-Billancourt ("the applicants"), had filed a
complaint with the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on December 2, 1996, under former
art. 25. The companies alleged violation of home and private and family life (art. 8).
147
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was inadmissible (arguing that the Court had no jurisdiction over legal persons), the Court replied:
“[T]he rights and obligations attributed to companies become rights and obligations for the
individuals who comprise them.”153 In other words, the Court recognized the rights of the
corporation through its shareholder. Thus, while legal persons (companies) cannot apply directly
to the Court, the Court nevertheless protects the interests of the corporation by potentially granting
shareholders the right to apply on behalf of a corporation.154
2. Corporate jus standi before international economic tribunals
The WTO is a unique international organization responsible for trade relations between States.
Created by the Uruguay Round negotiations,155 it is based in Geneva. Together with other
specialized agencies, it develops economic policies at the global level.156 Although corporations
are de jure excluded from the proceedings, their interests are nonetheless well protected before the
organization. Indeed, the practice before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO is open
to the possibility for companies to file amicus briefs. 157 Moreover, through its principles, such as
the most-favored-nation clause and national treatment, the WTO can diminish the ability of States
to take measures relating to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or human rights.158 In addition
to WTO regulations, the liberalization process can lead to “corporate social irresponsibility”159 for
the sole purpose of preserving their commercial advantages in a highly competitive global market.
Finally, one should not underestimate a corporation’s capacity to exert considerable pressure on
States to resort to the WTO's dispute settlement system which gives them indirect access to this
body.160
International investment law has been built around two sets of rules: the law on the status of
foreigners and the mobility of factors of production.161 Given this dual origin, several elements
characterize international investment. On the one hand, international investment law favors
bilateralism rather than multilateralism to guarantee greater mobility. On the other hand,
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investment is conceived in a varied manner and contains different sources, which explains its lack
of definition in international law.
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, known as the Washington Convention
of 1965, does not define international investment either,162 although it creates an International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).163 This Centre, which is part of the World
Bank Group, provides conciliation and arbitration facilities to settle any investment dispute. The
implementation of the Convention is the most important innovation and consists of three phases:
(i) the Convention must be signed by the States, including the State of nationality of the investor
and the host State; (ii) the right to refer to the ICSID—an international body—is granted to
multinational companies as the investors; and164 (iii) this right is translated into a written document
of acceptance to submit the dispute to the Center.165
The ICSID procedure contains several elements that actually contribute to the impunity of
corporations and reinforce their power in international relations. In general, the claimants are
investment companies with the nationality of a State Party, while the defendant to the dispute is a
State Party to the Washington Convention. It should be noted that, before the ICSID, the procedure
is one-way:
[I]n the past two decades, thousands of investment agreements (mostly bilateral) have
been negotiated. Their predominant focus on protecting investors’ rights coupled with
their insular investor-State dispute settlement process not only constrains the
regulatory space available to a State to protect and fulfill the human rights of its people
but also limits the opportunities to seek effective remedies for business-related human
rights abuses. Investors, although not a party to these agreements, are able to sue the
relevant State to protect their commercial interests, but States or the affected
communities cannot generally bring an action against an investor under these
agreements for alleged human rights abuses linked to an investment project.166
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State sovereignty is directly affected by ICSID proceedings for several reasons. First, the right to
bring a case before the Centre is an opportunity which, in return, prevents the home State from
exercising its diplomatic protection or its traditional powers.167 Second, when the corporation has
the right to refer a case to the ICSID, it is not necessary for the corporation to exhaust the domestic
remedies of the host State168 (a rule that is well known in customary international law and is
imposed on all international proceedings open to individuals).169 Third, when it comes to defending
the interests of companies, international mediation and conciliation channels are favored to the
detriment of domestic courts: “[A] large fraction of disputes related to foreign investments
nowadays is settled by private arbitration and not by national courts. So corporate law firms and
accounting firms add yet additional layers to routine transnational rule-making.”170
Undoubtedly, international economic courts and dispute settlements favor corporate interests over
human rights of individuals and communities.
Conclusion
By excluding corporations from international documentation and proceedings, mechanisms uphold
the false narrative that violence and crimes are specific to the Global South.171 Justice must be a
collective responsibility and should adopt all-inclusive approaches to dealing with the past. To
achieve this goal, a profound institutional reform is needed that would adapt the international
regulatory frameworks and mechanisms to the contemporary socio-economic developments.
Concretely, the ongoing diplomatic processes negotiating the treaty regimes for corporate conduct
should adopt the normative framework that provide a possibility for victims to raise complaints
against business entities and require corporations to, at the very least, report before those
institutions on their human rights conduct and measures adopted. Furthermore, the intergovernmental negotiations under the Human Rights Council should not prevent States from
adopting the necessary amendments to include corporations into the Rome Statute. According to
Professors Anghi and Chimni, the prosecution of corporations before the ICC could correct the
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misrepresentation of “Third World conflicts” in the Global South and thus bring more legitimacy
to the Court if political obstacles are removed.172
It is necessary to reconsider international law and adapt it to the development of international
society. Above all, it is essential to reflect on the rise of multinational corporations with complex,
even opaque, legal structures, in a global order that benefits them. Finally, we must question the
consequences of their activities on populations (and peoples) within unequal power relationships
and on the respect of international law by these companies. International law must therefore be a
tool to hold multinational corporations accountable for their international crimes and not a pretext
to avoid such accountability.
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